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Religion, religious conflict, and the neuroscientific turn
In their introductory essay to a volume analyzing contemporary religious con-
flict from three social science perspectives, Powell and Clarke both catalogue and 
unwittingly reinforce an assumption that has long underwritten and continues to 
inform theories about the intersection between religion, (in)tolerance, and con-
flict, namely that pre-Enlightenment societies were typically intolerant.2 At the 
other end of the historical spectrum and until recently the beginning point for 
this hostility towards religious unorthodoxy has been set at the moment of Chris-
tianity’s official adoption (313 CE) on the premise that polytheism is, by con-
trast, inherently tolerant.3 By polytheism is meant – with the exception of ancient 
and early post-Second Temple Judaism – the religions of the ancient Greek and 
Roman worlds. While the starting point for this so-called rise in intolerance has 
in recent years been pushed back into the third century,4 the overwhelmingly 
dominant view persists that once Christianity became a religio licita and gained 
political power it became coercive, intolerant, and not infrequently violent.5 The 
nostalgic view that the classical polytheist world is one of religious tolerance and 
coexistence, whereas monotheism, which is exclusivist, is responsible for much 
of the religious violence perpetrated between the rise of Christianity and the end 
of pre-modern history,6 is, as Jan Bremmer and other theorists of religion have 
recently argued, itself an artefact of post-Enlightenment liberalism. This is an 
ideology which, in response to the protracted post-Reformation religious wars in 
Europe, conceived of religion as antithetical to the new age of science and reason 
and so sought to write religion permanently out of society. Henceforth it was 
restricted to the private domain.7 This view of religion as in its death throes and 
as having no future impact on society is a hallmark of secularization theory.8 Con-
temporary religious conflicts that engage the state are, in this view, to be attrib-
uted to a traditional or pre-modern, irrational society. This is an important point 
to which we will return, but for the moment let us simply point out that, with 
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Western governmental responses to religious conflicts, as well as inform the ways 
in which Western scholars attempt to understand the phenomenon.9
As Fox and Sandler point out, scholars have been scrambling since the events 
of 9/11 both to explain the role of religion in an upsurge in national and transna-
tional violence10 and to reintroduce religion as a significant social variable into 
social, political, and international relations theory.11 Research on this perceived 
new rise in religious intolerance is in some areas starting to align with insights 
from neuroscientific research that began to emerge in the 1980s and that have 
steadily been gaining acceptance, to the effect that the mind is embodied, and 
that affect or emotion has primacy to reasoned thought, particularly in regard to 
moral judgement.12 If we accept that cognitive and moral systems lie behind the 
evolution within human society of religion,13 then these findings have profound 
implications for the viability of secularization theory and a liberal view of the 
(negligible) social impact of religion. In fact one of the pioneers of such studies 
has long argued that the age of reason is a chimera that we need to move beyond, 
if we are to understand and accommodate morality (and thus religion) as a sig-
nificant factor in human behaviour and society.14 Ironically it is precisely what 
the age of Enlightenment rejected (the embodied mind) in favour of a body-mind 
dualism that promoted the priority of reason on the basis of science that science is 
now asking us to re-accept.
By now, the reader will be wondering what any of this has to do with religious 
conflict in general and the pursuit of the topic in relation to early Christianity 
and late antiquity in particular, but again the implications are profound. Firstly, 
religious tolerance is not an absolute, but in fact itself a moral virtue embraced by 
secularist liberal ideology.15 It is a social construct of Enlightenment thought. If 
the foundations of that ideology are now in question, then we must ask whether 
that virtue’s entailment – that religious intolerance is an evil, in that it damages 
the health of society – is valid. After all, as Powell and Clarke point out, liberalism 
itself would argue for a limit to tolerance when the tolerance of another religion 
is harmful to society.16 Indeed, it is precisely this argument that we see informing 
recent conclusions concerning the limits of the tolerance of other religions under 
Roman rule in the period before Constantine.17 The implication of this is that, 
even when we think that as scholars we are deconstructing dominant assumptions 
(in this case the inherent intolerance of monotheist and tolerance of polytheist 
religion), we need to ask ourselves whether, instead of succeeding, we are in fact 
simply adopting another element of the same paradigm.
Secondly, if a pre-Enlightenment view of the world is how we as human beings 
in fact behave and act in the world from a moral-religious perspective, then this 
is something we should intentionally move to embrace rather than back away 
from. The findings of the neurosciences do not condemn us to a world of super-
stition and prejudice from which we thought we had escaped,18 but rather help 
us to accept the affective agency of religion in human society as a biological 
fact,19 while providing us with tools that help us to explain and understand it. 
Further, if religion is to be inserted back into and perhaps even foregrounded in 
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contemporary social-scientific and political theories, then it makes sense that it 
is to a world that conceived of religion in a way that is aligned with embodied 
cognition that we should look for answers. This is particularly the case, if, as cur-
rent neuroscientific studies suggest, consciously suppressing in our own minds a 
rationalist view of the world that has been cognitively strengthened since birth is 
likely to prove extremely difficult.20 While some answers may lie in taking a fresh 
look at traditional and/or non-Western societies and cultures,21 including those of 
Africa, a fresh investigation of the role of religion in the pre-Enlightenment world 
and in the historical period which is thought to have witnessed the (old) “rise of 
intolerance,” in particular – that is, the centuries immediately before and after the 
“rise of Christianity” – is likely to prove equally fruitful. This is particularly the 
case when we consider that in the ancient and late ancient Mediterranean world 
from the fifth century BCE up to at least the fifth century CE in elite circles a 
model of individual and societal health that was intimately linked to both moral-
ity and the embodied soul/mind held sway,22 while across society the excluded 
middle – that is, the world of the supernatural – and religion were both enmeshed 
and embedded.23 In these respects, whether one examines a philosophic sect, a 
monotheist, syncretist, hybrid, poly- or heno-theist religion in this period makes 
little difference. This point is important since, as we will see shortly, theorization 
of religious conflict in this period has been criticized for its Christianity-centred 
focus. Further, since social health is a desideratum not just of modern liberal ide-
ology, but lies behind the moral foundational systems that have evolved across 
societies up to the present day,24 we could just as well flip the subtitle of a recent 
book on the embeddedness of morality in twenty-first-century American politics25 
and ask: how can we understand twenty-first-century religious conflict without 
a first- (or second-, third-, or fourth-) century brain? Curiously this is precisely 
what has been proposed in a 2013 doctoral dissertation in the discipline of criti-
cal rhetoric. Appealing to Gorgias and the classical Greek theory of the sophist 
as social physician, the author, Brett Ingram, argues for the integration of the 
neurosciences into critical rhetorical theory in order to understand and address 
issues like the impact of rhetorical violence – a significant component in religious 
conflict – on the principle that current neuroscience confirms a surprising number 
of theories held by ancient Graeco-Roman philosophers on the embodied mind.26
Towards a new theorizing of religious conflict
Having established that study of religious conflict in an historical period at first 
sight so distant from the twenty-first century – but, as we can now see, not so 
distant at all – is not just an academic exercise, but may in fact prove essential to 
helping us understand and negotiate religious conflict in the contemporary world, 
the next step is to engage in laying a fresh set of theoretical foundations that incor-
porate and internalize what, for lack of a better term, we will call the neuroscientific 
turn.27 This is important, if we are to move towards a self-conscious re-examination 
of religion and religious conflict in these critical(?) centuries.28 In order to do this, 
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however, we must first step back and take stock of some of the theories and presup-
positions that dominate current readings of the phenomenon in early Christianity 
and late antiquity. We then need to address the plethora of definitions that attach 
to some of the terms used and the lack of clear definition in the case of others.29 
Lastly, we also need to ask ourselves what assumptions lie behind these approaches 
and to what subconscious ideological or moral systems they are attributable. That 
is, the more we lay out in the open, the better our chance of assessing what contin-
ues to be valid and what does not in a worldview that incorporates the embodied 
mind, as well as of improving our capacity to be self-conscious and self-critical 
about how and even why we study religious conflict. The latter is critical, since, as 
the neurosciences now point out, we ourselves rationalize the world and perform 
actions on the basis of what Burke would call a particular piety, that is, an individu-
alized, internally coherent, largely subconscious moral system.30 This is a substan-
tial undertaking and not all of these steps can be completed in one chapter. Even 
engaging in just the first step – a critique of dominant and current approaches – is 
sufficient to demonstrate, however, that the neuroscientific turn disrupts our current 
approaches to religious conflict, while simultaneously pointing towards a number 
of paths for research that have been neglected.
Current approaches
Polytheism = tolerance | monotheism = intolerance
When we turn to current approaches, we have already raised and largely decon-
structed one of the most dominant to date, that of polytheist (i.e., pre-Christian) 
tolerance and monotheist (i.e., Christian) intolerance. This, as a number of schol-
ars have recently pointed out,31 is a view that emerges within secularist liberal 
ideology in reaction to the bloody and protracted intra-Christian religious wars in 
Europe in the seventeenth century. At its crudest, the logical flow is that the Chris-
tian state was responsible for indefensible social harm, so religion (Christianity) 
must be excised from the political = public sphere. Since this is then enshrined as 
a doctrine of the separation of Church and state, the entire period during which 
the two were not separate, that is, the entire period in European history from the 
seventeenth century back to the conversion of Constantine, comes under suspi-
cion. It thus serves to set the beginning point for Christianity’s harmful impact 
on society at 313 CE. In this view, a period in which no religion gained political 
dominance within the cultures that gave birth to Europe becomes a golden age, 
imbued with the virtue of religious tolerance. In this nostalgic view the Roman 
imperial cult is conveniently forgotten or its influence on the state not viewed as 
comparable to that of Christianity. In this crude outline we can see the origins of 
at least two other lenses through which, to date, the study of religious conflict has 
been filtered: 1. That the conversion of Constantine constitutes a benchmark in the 
decline of religious tolerance; and; 2. A narrow focus on the religions of Greece 
and Rome, on the one hand, and on Christianity, on the other.32 We need to note 
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here that recently scholars have been working hard to foreground and overcome 
these biases.33 This activity is associated with awareness-raising that concepts like 
“religion,” “religious violence,” “tolerance,” and “intolerance” are not emic, that 
is part of the internal thought-world of Graeco-Roman society, until well beyond 
the fourth century CE.34 And we have to admit that the concept “religious conflict” 
is likewise a modern, etic construct. It needs to be noted, however, that regardless 
of whether we adopt more emic terms like “forbearance” and “compulsion,” as 
Maijastina Kahlos proposes,35 we are still in essence addressing the same con-
cepts. As we have already pointed out, the recent turn in scholarship towards an 
argument that there were limits to polytheist tolerance, matched by corresponding 
limits to Christian intolerance, while it appears to deconstruct this overarching 
model, in fact operates from within the same paradigm, where religious tolerance 
is a (modern, liberal) socially constructed virtue.36
The religious marketplace
A second dominant model, that of the religious marketplace, is related, and simi-
larly benchmarks the conversion of Constantine and focuses attention on Christi-
anity and the religions of Greece and Rome. In this model, derived from Rational 
Choice Theory, which is in turn anchored in the economic theory of Adam Smith, 
Christianity emerges in a pluri-religious urban society where it is in competition 
for converts.37 The focus here is on the rise to success of Christianity against 
the other available religions. Within this model, the character of the relationship 
between religions in the first three centuries CE is described by the four Cs: coex-
istence, co-operation, competition, and conflict.38 The ideas of rivalry, competi-
tion, or struggle as important social factors in turn have their basis in evolutionary 
and Marxist social theory.39 In scholarship deriving from the discipline of Classics 
as opposed to Early Christian or Biblical Studies, in terms of the relationship 
between cults in the Hellenistic and Roman world competition has been viewed 
as both a social phenomenon and as an engine of religious change.40 Both sets of 
ideas have been discussed and critiqued at length by Engels and Van Nuffelen in 
their introduction to the volume Religion and Competition in Antiquity, although 
it should be noted that they see the marketplace as a problematic metaphor rather 
than engaging directly with Stark and other rational choice of religion theorists.41 
What they do usefully highlight, for our purposes, is the failure of the negative 
entailment of this set of ideas, that Christianity signals the end of competition.42 
Of even greater significance is that this set of theories, too, emerges from within 
secularist liberal ideology that sees reason as a primary agent and religious plural-
ism as an ideal and that equates religious competition (equivalent to free market 
capitalism) with religious vitality.43 Here the assumption of “rational choice” as 
applied to religion is particularly problematic. Where previous criticism of these 
models has focused on the validity of the idea of choice,44 current neuroscientific 
findings about the primacy of affect over reason when it comes to moral judge-
ment undermine not the idea of choice in regard to religion, but the primacy of 
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reason in such a choice. These studies suggest, on the contrary, that emotion and 
intuition most likely play an initial role and that a person then rationalizes his or 
her choice, if at all, after the fact.45
By now it will be clear that modern sociology of religion as a discipline is 
to a large extent still under the influence of functionalist and secularist post- 
Enlightenment modes of thought and we must also ask whether a theory of reli-
gious competition per se, whether applied to a pluri-religious society, as is assumed 
to describe Graeco-Roman society prior to the conversion of Constantine, or one 
in which a single religion dominates, as is assumed to be the case subsequently, 
should not itself be subjected to critical re-examination. That is, competition as a 
model may or may not be a valid tool for assessing the role of religion in society 
in the ancient to late ancient world. If we are to accept or reject it with confidence, 
however, we need at the very least to expose to critical examination the ideologi-
cal origins of the model and ask whether, given that religion has no clear defini-
tion within society at this period,46 competition offers an adequate explanation.
A further point is that the ideology that underlies both the (in)tolerance and com-
petition models and their variants is fundamentally Euro- (= Western-) centric, as 
is the bulk of the scholarship that informs them.47 This, as we have already noted, 
creates an unconscious bias towards what are perceived to be the great ances-
tors of Europe and its Enlightenment – Greece and Rome and their religions – 
and to the successor majority religion that shaped the history of Europe and its 
colonies, Christianity. As scholars of Judaism, among others, have rightly pointed 
out, much scholarship on religion in classical and late antiquity to date retains 
these biases.48 So scholars from within the discipline of Classical studies rightly 
criticise scholars of New Testament, Early Christian and Late Antique studies 
of examining Graeco-Roman religion through Christian-coloured or monotheist 
lenses.49 The same criticism, however, can be levelled at much of the scholar-
ship on Judaism, on religions beyond the borders of the Roman empire,50 and on 
Manichaeism in this period, where the religions are examined less in their own 
right than from a predominantly Graeco-Roman-religious as well as Christian 
perspective.
Another entailment of these models and their underlying ideology, particularly 
in relation to the question of religious conflict, is a second subconscious bias, this 
time towards viewing each religion as a monolithic entity. While recent scholar-
ship, with its emphasis on a spectrum of co-existing Judaisms, Islams, or Chris-
tianities, is beginning to unpack this bias in relation to monotheistic religions,51 
this conceptualisation of religion needs to be brought into greater dialogue with 
the view of polytheist cults as being by nature individual and local in their expres-
sion.52 What current neuroscientific research on liberal versus conservative moral 
systems and on the intersection between affect, reason and behaviour suggests is 
that the adherents and their beliefs and practices within all religious systems are 
susceptible to polarization.53 This language at present appears rarely, if at all, in 
the literature.54 The concept of polarization itself suggests that religious conflict 
should be viewed not as a fixed or end state but as a process, while we need also 
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to pay attention to the idea that all religious groups, not just monotheisms, are 
susceptible to sectarian fragmentation.55 Under what conditions this phenomenon 
occurs or fails to occur across the full range of religions that existed in the ancient 
to late ancient world and to what degree it is attributable to the character of the 
individual religion (as opposed to other factors) is an avenue of research as yet 
inadequately explored.
Religious conflict = religious violence
This leads us to a third approach that currently dominates the study of both 
contemporary and early Christian and late ancient religious conflicts. This is 
an approach that views religious conflict from the sole perspective of one of its 
(extreme) modes of expression, religious violence. This holds true whether the 
focus is physical or rhetorical violence. Bremmer in his 2014 article, “Religious 
Violence between Greeks, Romans, Christian and Jews,” refers to the appear-
ance in the preceding decade of a “tsunami” of studies of the phenomenon in 
antiquity.56 While this is somewhat exaggerated for antiquity, it comes closer to 
the mark when we add in books, articles, and new journals that seek to explain 
the phenomenon in the twenty-first century.57 The recent increase in publications 
on religious fundamentalism and martyrdom both ancient and modern can be 
included as subsets of this approach.58 This emphasis in response to not just the 
events of 9/11, but the constant reporting in the media of fresh examples around 
the world of suicide bombings, beheadings of apostates, and destruction of cultic 
sites is natural and has its uses. These we will discuss in a moment. The prob-
lem arises when this overwhelming emphasis on an extreme becomes fixed in 
both public and academic perception as representing the whole,59 leading to the 
neglect not just of other potentially significant aspects of religious conflict, but of 
informed discussion on the question of where religious conflict in all its aspects 
and manifestations fits into concepts of social harm and social good.
The latter is a huge question that cannot be unpacked here.60 Instead we will 
look briefly at the utility of just two of the numerous viewpoints and findings that 
have emerged from this vast body of research, one from contemporary studies, 
one from the study of late antiquity. Firstly, as Fox and Sandler point out, the 
focus on religious violence has opened up debate about the nature of the relation-
ship between politics, ethnicity, race, and religion in national and transnational 
conflicts.61 We see a similar discussion emerging in the work of Engels and Van 
Nuffelen concerning the Graeco-Roman world, where they argue for the inter-
weaving of religion with ethnic and cultural differences, social distinctions, and 
politics.62 The work of both Lakoff, in particular, and Haidt, in general, drawing 
on their own experimental work and that of others in the neurosciences, confirms 
the existence of an intimate connection at the cognitive level with morality in the 
case of politics.63 Secondly, among scholars who study the world of late antiquity 
the focus on violence has drawn attention to an observable disjunction between 
violent discourse or speech and violent action. This is still in the process of being 
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unpacked, but emerges most clearly in the case of the destruction of the cultic 
buildings and images of one religion (in this case, a variety of Graeco-Roman 
cults) by another (Christianity). Here a significant discrepancy is being revealed 
between the reportage of acts of violence in the dominant religion’s rhetoric and 
the physical evidence.64 Without the benefit of verifiable evidence, a similar dis-
cussion is nonetheless opening up regarding the relationship between stories of 
martyrdom and persecution in the early Christian centuries and their historical 
reality.65 In this respect, Ingram’s insightful discussion of the impact of violent 
rhetoric on the brain as physiological trauma opens up an avenue for dialogue 
between these discussions in late antiquity, research from the neurosciences, and 
critical rhetoric.66 A significant aspect of religious conflict that has not been well 
explained by sociological theories to date is the precise nature of the relation-
ship between what a religious leader says, the impact of that speech on a fol-
lower’s brain, and that follower’s actions. What Burke’s piety theory, the theories 
of Bourdieu, and the current neuroscientific research together suggest is that this 
is in some respects simple and in others quite complex.67
Religious conflict = identity-formation
The emphasis on violence and the raising of questions about the role of the rheto-
ric of violence in relation to it brings us to one final influential perspective from 
which religious conflict in early Christianity and late antiquity has been addressed, 
which will be discussed only in brief. This is the analysis of conflict rhetoric 
through the lens of identity theory, more specifically the role of in-group/out-
group bias in constructing identity.68 This theory, adopted from social psychology, 
has been particularly influential in Late Antique studies, where the language of 
alterity, deviancy, and discussion of strategies of delegitmization of out-groups – 
for instance, bestial language applied to Jews, or accusations of child sacrifice 
against Christians – is common.69 It also lies behind the oppositional labels “her-
esy/heterodoxy” and “orthodoxy.”70 Here, as in the case, of the first two theo-
ries discussed, we again see a marked bias in application towards Christianity,71 
this time with some slight justification in that Christianity is a newly emergent 
religion. The implications extend far beyond the identity-formation of Christian-
ity and its various expressions, however, and there is much work to be done on 
how the rhetoric and/or praxis of other newly emerging religious groups, such as 
Rabbinic Judaism, Manichaeism, and Islam, was received,72 and how the rheto-
ric that accompanied the refashioning of the identity of existing religious groups 
spawned, or emerged from within (and thus reinforced), conflict.73 Slight progress 
has been made in broadening research into the in-group/out-group oppositional 
categories heresy-orthodoxy, where it is now, if slowly, increasingly being rec-
ognized that this particular bias is not specific to Christianity in particular, nor 
monotheisms in general.74 There is also an emerging discussion about the gap 
between heresy-orthodoxy discourse, which foregrounds belief, and orthopraxy, 
which is now thought in regard to personal religious identity in the ancient to 
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late ancient world to have had priority.75 This has potential implications for the 
current direction in sociology-of-religion research, with its emphasis on religious 
fundamentalism.
Where identity research is beginning to produce particularly valuable insights 
concerns an emerging recognition of the gap between rhetoric that had previously 
been read as indicative of historical inter-group conflict and the reality that this is 
an example of in-group/out-group bias where the out-group label is used to refer to 
a deviant other inside the same religion. That is, what is rhetorically constructed as 
inter-group religious conflict, such as “pagan-Christian” or “Christian-Jewish,” is 
now being revealed as a product of intra- or inner-group conflict in which the issue 
of clarifying group identity in a time of uncertainty is in the foreground. An exam-
ple is the article by Douglas Boin, in which he deconstructs the previously influ-
ential oppositional categories “pagan” and “Christian.”76 This finding opens up 
our reading of current “Islamic-Christian” or “Islamic-Jewish” religious conflicts.
Of equal interest are recent studies which show how the application of in-group/
out-group strategies in intra-group conflict can spread conflict beyond the group 
to the religion that is not the original target of the conflict, but is employed as the 
scapegoated other. Abel Mordechai Bibliowicz’s recent book arguing that anti-
Semitism is a by-product (an “unintended” consequence) of early intra-Christian 
conflict and identity-formation is an important example.77 One final avenue of 
interest is recent discussion of the gap between increased activity directed towards 
memory construction inside a religious group – this is not explicitly polemical, 
but might be thought to suggest a response to external pressures – and histori-
cal reality, which indicates minimal real local or regional inter-religious conflict. 
This research is emerging in particular from exploration of the impact on local 
Christianities of the Arab conquest and the rise of a competing, dominant religion, 
Islam.78 Such studies bring into ever-increasing question assumptions about the 
direct link between conflict rhetoric and conflict reality that have long held sway. 
Here again, the insights emerging from much of this research could be deepened 
by being brought more explicitly into dialogue with experimental psychology and 
neuroscientific research.79 As Mar Marcos argues, maybe approaches that saw 
Christian narratives of violence towards other religions as reflecting real violence 
prove problematic not because there is no direct link between such narratives and 
actual violence, but because they placed the cart before the horse.80 Is it possible, 
she asks, that the narratives of violence that arose as a part of boundary demarca-
tion are causative? Instead of commemorating historical reality, did they subtly 
encourage acts of violence that occurred after the fact? The full mapping out of the 
agency of identity-formation in religious conflict, on the one hand, and of religious 
conflict in identity-formation, on the other, remains as yet some distance away.
Conclusion
If we are not at the beginning of a re-theorization of religious conflict, then the 
neurosciences are demonstrating compellingly that we should be. In showing that 
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the primacy of reason in moral judgement is a myth, they disrupt ways of looking 
at the phenomenon that have dominated research, public perception, and govern-
mental responses. At the very least, their findings call on us to attribute greater 
agency to emotion in religious belief, discourse, and action, than has previously 
been the case. Their precise implication for a revised theory of religious conflict, 
on the other hand, has yet to be unfolded. We argued that the first step is to engage 
in laying a fresh set of theoretical foundations that incorporate and internalize 
what, for lack of a better term, we called the neuroscientific turn.81 In order to do 
that, we argued, we must first critically examine the theories that currently under-
gird how we describe, frame, and respond to religious conflict. This chapter has 
been a first step in that direction. As we suggested, even engaging in just the very 
beginnings of this first step – a critique of dominant and current approaches – has 
been sufficient to demonstrate that the neuroscientific turn disrupts our current 
approaches to religious conflict, while simultaneously pointing towards a number 
of paths for research that have been neglected or insufficiently explained. Further, 
this tentative step has shown how important it is for us as scholars to be more 
self-reflective and self-critical of our inherent Burkean pieties. One of the felici-
tous side-effects of this endeavour is that as scholars of religion in antiquity, late 
antiquity or African studies we are no longer required to find justifications for our 
research. On the contrary, if we are to understand why religious conflict occurs 
today in what is increasingly being acknowledged as the failure of the Age of Rea-
son in what is biologically an embodied-mind world, then study of the phenom-
enon in the ancient to late ancient world, alongside studies of the phenomenon 
in historical and contemporary Africa – societies in which the embodied mind is 
accepted and in which religion is entwined with private and public life at every 
level – can now play an important, perhaps even central, role.
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l’Antiquité tardive (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2010); and Elizabeth DePalma Digeser, A 
Threat to Public Piety: Christians, Platonists, and the Great Persecution (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2012). The phrase “rise of intolerance” is itself predicated on 
a post-Enlightenment “rise of tolerance” in the Western world; see Powell and Clarke, 
“Religion, Tolerance, and Intolerance,” 7–8.
 5 See Mayer, “Religious Conflict,” 13. Jan Bremmer, “Religious Violence,” 12–14; and 
Kahlos, Forbearance and Compulsion; and ead., Dialogue and Debate: Christian and 
Pagan Cultures c. 360–430 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), have done much to decon-
struct this view. The emerging view is summed up by Dirk Rohmann, Book-Burning 
and Censorship in Late Antiquity, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 135 (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2016), “Introduction” (p. 15, ebook version): “while religious conflicts 
demonstrably occurred, the Christianisation of the Roman Empire was much more 
peaceful and consensual than this . . . evidence implies at first glance.” See, however, 
David Frankfurter, “ ‘Religious Violence’: A Phenomenology,” Ancient Jew Review, 
February 24, 2016, www.ancientjewreview.com/articles/2016/2/24/religious-violence-
a-phenomenology, accessed March 26, 2017, who cautions against this overly irenic 
view of religion and argues for the need for a phenomenology of religious violence.
 6 In situating the roots of religious violence in monotheism, the work of the Egyptologist 
Jan Assmann has been particularly influential. See, e.g., J. Assmann, Moses the Egyp-
tian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1997); id., Die Mosaische Unterscheidung oder der Preis des Monotheismus 
(München: Hanser Akzente, 2003); id., Monotheismus und die Sprache der Gewalt 
(Wien: Picus Verlag, 2006); and most recently the essay, “Monotheismus und Gewalt,” 
January 29, 2013, www.perlentaucher.de/essay/monotheismus-und-gewalt.html; 
accessed March 26, 2017; and, for a sample of critiques of his views, Losehand, “Reli-
gious Harmony,” 111–12; Jan Bremmer, “Religious Violence and Its Roots: A View 
from Antiquity,” Asdiwal: Revue genevoise d’ánthropologie et d’historie des religions 
6 (2011): 71–9; and René Bloch, “Polytheismus und Monotheismus in der paganen 
Antike: Zu Jan Assmanns Monotheismus-Kritik,” in Fremdbilder-Selbstbilder: 
Imaginationen des Judentums von der Antike bis in die Neuzeit, ed. R. Bloch et al. 
(Basel: Verlag Schwabe, 2010), 5–24. It is of interest that approaches from the per-
spective of evolutionary biology can arrive at the same conclusion. See, e.g., John Tee-
han, In the Name of God: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Ethics and Violence 
(Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), who, although he sees the moral psychology 
that predisposes us towards religion as responsible for violence, not religion per se, 
nonetheless views the universalist/exclusivist tendencies within Christianity’s moral 
code as problematic. Regardless of whether he does so because the New Atheists, 
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among others, single out the three great monotheist religions as causative, his focus 
on Judaism, Christianity, and Islam serves unintentionally to underwrite this position.
 7 In addition to Bremmer, “Religious Violence,” 11–13, see the analyses of Powell and 
Clarke, “Religion, Tolerance, and Intolerance,” 1–6; and Jonathan Fox and Schmuel 
Sandler, “The Question of Religion and World Politics,” in Religion in World Conflict, 
ed. J. Fox and S. Sandler (London: Routledge, 2006), 4–6.
 8 See Fox and Sandler, “The Question of Religion,” 4; and the essay by Ingmar Persson 
and Julian Savulescu, “The Limits of Religious Tolerance: A Secular View,” in Reli-
gion, Intolerance, and Conflict, 236–52.
 9 The drive of Western liberalism is particularly evident in contemporary Anglophone 
studies of the phenomenon. See, e.g., in addition to the essays in Clarke et al., eds., 
Religion, Intolerance, and Conflict (esp. the essay by Powell and Clarke, 1–3, which 
raises the views of New Atheism), William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Vio-
lence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), and the lengthy review essay by Vincent W. Lloyd, “Violence: Religious, 
Theological, Ontological,” Theory, Culture and Society 28.5 (2011): 144–54. The blog 
by the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, posted September 21, 2007, “Moral Psy-
chology and the Misunderstanding of Religion,” http://edge.org/conversation/moral-
psychology-and-the-misunderstanding-of-religion, accessed March 26, 2017, and 
responses, are also instructive.
 10 Since the impact remains largely confined to Near Eastern, African, and Asian nations, 
this is perceived by Western scholars as being by no means as severe as the religious 
wars of the seventeenth century (e.g., Powell and Clarke, “Religion, Tolerance, and 
Intolerance,” 3). At the same time, there is some question as to whether the percep-
tion of a global increase in religious violence is justified. See the Pew Trust analysis 
of social hostilities involving religion 2006–2012, B.J. Grim et al., “Religious Hos-
tilities Reach Six-Year-High,” Pew Research Center, January 14, 2014, www.pew-
forum.org/2014/01/14/religious-hostilities-reach-six-year-high, accessed March 26, 
2017, that documents a genuine rise internationally in religious hostilities up to 2012. 
The updates, “Latest Trends in Religious Restrictions and Hostilities,” Pew Research 
Center, February 26, 2015, www.pewforum.org/2015/02/26/religious-hostilities, 
accessed March 26, 2017, and “Trends in Global Restrictions on Religion,” Pew 
Research Center, June 23, 2016, www.pewforum.org/2016/06/23/trends-in-global-
restrictions-on-religion, accessed March 26, 2017, indicate a global decline in religious 
hostilities since 2012, despite a rise in “religion-related terrorism.”
 11 Fox and Sandler, “The Question of Religion,” 5–6, 10; and see the sample list of result-
ing publications cited by Mayer, “Religious Conflict,” 1 n. 1. Fox and Sandler, “The 
Question of Religion,” 6, document the beginnings of a reintroduction of religion as an 
important factor into political science theory in the 1980s, but point out that this was 
never mainstream. The quest for explanation has had a concurrent impact on histori-
cal research. See Bremmer, “Religious Violence,” 8 n. 1, for a list of recent books on 
religious violence in antiquity.
 12 See, e.g., Steve Clarke, The Justification of Religious Violence (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2014), 58–88, building on the work of Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog 
and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychologi-
cal Review 108.4 (2001): 814–34, among others; and Brett Ingram, “Critical Rhetoric 
in the Age of Neuroscience” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 
2013). Ingram provides a substantial and extended critique of the literature to 2013.
 13 This is the view of Moral Foundations Theory, which draws in turn on the theory of 
Emile Durkheim (The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, 1912) regarding the 
social-binding function of morality (religion). See J. Graham et al., “Moral Founda-
tions Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism,” Advances in Experimental 
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Social Psychology 47 (2013): 55–130. Teehan, In the Name of God, applies this spe-
cifically to the topic of religious violence.
 14 See George Lakoff, The Political Mind: Why You Can’t Understand 21st-Century 
Politics with an 18th-Century Brain (New York: Viking, 2008); id., Moral Politics: 
How Liberals and Conservatives Think (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); 
and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind 
and Its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999). Omar Sultan 
Haque, “Moral Creationism: The Science of Morality and the Mutiny of Romantic 
Relativism,” Journal of Cognition and Culture 11.1 (2011): 151–87, argues a similar 
case on the basis of neuroscientific research and evolutionary psychology.
 15 See Powell and Clarke, “Religion, Tolerance, and Intolerance,” 5–7, who situate it 
within the moral foundation system of “harm/care.” On the latter see Graham et al., 
“Moral Foundations Theory,” but note that the proponents of MFT themselves point 
out that the foundational moral systems they have thus far identified are not final. 
On the latter, see Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph, “How Moral Foundations Theory 
Succeeded in Building on Sand: A Response to Suhler and Churchland,” Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience 23.9 (2011): 2117–18.
 16 Powell and Clarke, “Religion, Tolerance, and Intolerance,” 6. A recent example of the 
exercise of this principle is the triple rejection by local communities of the Hasidic Lev 
Tahor sectarian Jewish community within the USA, Canada, and now Guatemala on the 
basis that their practices and ideology were socially harmful (in each case contrary to 
state values enshrined in law). See Ian Johnston, “Orthodox Jews Expelled from Gua-
temalan Refuge After Being Threatened ‘with Lynching,’ ” The Independent, Sunday 
August 31, 2014, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/fundamentalist-jews-
expelled-from-guatemalan-refuge-after-being-threatened-with-lynching-9701807.
html, accessed September 12, 2014.
 17 Engels and Van Nuffelen, “Religion and Competition,” 13–14, who argue that the limit 
was reached “when a new religious form seemed to endanger the social and political 
cohesion of the city” or the later Roman state; and Kahlos, Forbearance and Compul-
sion, 9–27. Bremmer, “Religious Violence,” 14–18, is less concerned with arguing for 
tolerance within limits prior to the rise of Christianity than deconstructing the myth of 
polytheistic tolerance.
 18 The idea that modern society has evolved beyond more primitive uses of religion 
derives from Social Darwinism, a doctrine further developed by Marx. See Bryan 
Turner, “The Sociology of Religion,” in The SAGE Handbook of the Sociology of Reli-
gion, ed. J.A. Beckford and N.J. Demerath (London: Sage, 2007), 285.
 19 See Ryan McKay and Harvey Whitehouse, “Religion and Morality,” Psychological 
Bulletin 141.2 (2015): 447–73, who argue, however, that the concepts “morality” and 
“religion” themselves need to be deconstructed and carefully defined, if the relation-
ship between biology and culture is to be determined without bias.
 20 The embodied and cognitive intransigence of particular moral/value systems was first 
formulated by the rhetorician Kenneth Burke in Permanence and Change (1935) on 
the basis of his exposure to research on drug addiction. For a useful analysis of his 
theory of piety see Jordynn Jack, “ ‘The Piety of Degradation’: Kenneth Burke, the 
Bureau of Social Hygiene, and Permanence and Change,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 90.4 (2004): 446–68. His theory of piety has since been validated and for-
malised by recent neuroscientific research as set out by Ingram, “Critical Rhetoric in 
the Age of Neuroscience,” 55–100. I am deeply indebted to my colleague in Biblical 
Studies at Unisa, Johannes Vorster, for alerting me to the work of Burke on piety in the 
first instance. Interestingly, this theory neatly describes the anti-religious “religious” 
fervour of the New Atheists on the basis of their affective “addiction” to secularist 
rational liberal ideology.
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 21 This was the approach of Haidt, leading to insights concerning three additional foun-
dational moral systems. See his reflection on the influence of his postdoctoral research 
in India in the blog “What Makes People Vote Republican?” September 8, 2008, http://
edge.org/conversation/what-makes-vote-republican, accessed March 26, 2017. Dur-
kheim himself derived many of his theories about religion and society from his study 
of traditional societies, especially Australian aborigines.
 22 On the Greek conception of the body politic as susceptible to both disease and health, 
see G.E.R. Lloyd, In the Grip of Disease: Studies in the Greek Imagination (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003, repr. 2009), 1–13. For an outline and analysis of the 
medico-philosophical-moral therapeutic approach in the classical to early imperial 
periods, see Christopher Gill, “Philosophical Therapy as Preventive Psychological 
Medicine,” in Mental Disorders in the Classical World, ed. W.V. Harris (Leiden: Brill, 
2013), 339–62. The literature, both primary and secondary, on the therapy of the emo-
tions in the ancient Graeco-Roman world is substantial.
 23 On the latter point, see Bremmer, “Religious Violence,” 11–12; Engels and Van Nuf-
felen, “Religion and Competition,” 12.
 24 On the basis of his experimental research, Haidt argues in “Moral Psychology” that, 
regardless of where one sits on the conservative-liberal spectrum, the foundational 
harm/care system is a guiding principle, whereas all of the foundational systems are 
concerned with regulating selfishness for the benefit of the social group.
 25 Lakoff, The Political Mind, subtitled in its original printing: “Why You Can’t Under-
stand 21st-Century Politics with an 18th-Century Brain.”
 26 Ingram, “Critical Rhetoric in the Age of Neuroscience,” esp. 14, 49–50. The primacy 
of affect/emotion over reason, one of the more significant recent neuroscientific find-
ings, points us directly back to the Hellenistic emphasis on therapy of the affects/emo-
tions, with significant implications for the connection between hate-filled or emotive 
speech and its (differentiated) impacts on the conscious mind and subconscious brain 
of the listener.
 27 This is to distinguish it from the “cognitive turn,” a label employed in scholarly litera-
ture of the 1980s and ’90s to reference the application of findings and theories from 
psychology.
 28 The question mark attached to “critical” is deliberate, in that the notion of a “rise of 
intolerance,” whether located in the third or fourth century CE, and the link drawn to 
the rise to political dominance of monotheism (Christianity) – language now being 
recycled in relation to the twenty-first century and the rise to political dominance of 
another monotheist religion, Islam – are both concepts that require careful critical 
examination.
 29 This is the case not just with the terms “religion,” “tolerance,” “intolerance,” “religious 
conflict,” “violence,” but also with “social harm,” “social health,” and “virtue.”
 30 What cognitive theorists appear to agree on, regardless of the particular aspect of cog-
nition on which their research focuses, is that the general systems they describe are 
comprised of different components from within a large set of variables at the level of 
the individual brain. In terms of morality, two conflicting variables in the same subset, 
however, cannot be held by the same individual brain at the same time. On neural bind-
ing, biconceptualism and moral contradiction see Lakoff, The Political Mind, 69–72.
 31 See nn. 3 and 7–8 above. Losehand, “Religious Harmony,” 104–9, provides a detailed 
and helpful critique of the myths associated with this ideology, tracing its development 
through Hume, Locke and Gibbon, among others. Canella, “Tolleranza e intolleranza,” 
249–52, independently traces a similar trajectory.
 32 Although they debate precisely how the conversion of Constantine was a benchmark 
and do not explicitly focus on issues of (in)tolerance, the work of senior scholars of 
late antiquity is indicative in this regard. See, e.g., Peter Brown, The Rise of Western 
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Christendom: Triumph and Diversity, AD 200–1000 (Oxford: B.H. Blackwell, 1996); 
Ramsay MacMullen, Christianizing the Roman Empire: A.D. 100–400 (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1984); id., Christianity and Paganism in the Fourth to Eighth 
Centuries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Alan Cameron, The Last 
Pagans of Rome (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). The recent French, Spanish, 
and Canadian projects referenced in Mayer, “Religious Conflict,” 9–10, 12–13, that 
are more explicitly concerned with issues of tolerance and intolerance, along with the 
articles in Une antiquité tardive noire ou heureuse? Actes du colloque international de 
Besançon (12 et 13 novembre 2014), Institut des Sciences et Techniques de l’Antiquité, 
ed. Stéphane Ratti (Besançon: Presses Universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2015), like-
wise follow these paths.
 33 E.g., the works of Losehand, Canella, Bremmer, Kahlos, Engels, and Van Nuffelen 
cited (nn. 3 and 5 above). Similarly, Mar Marcos in her article, “ ‘He Forced with 
Gentleness’: Emperor Julian’s Attitude to Religious Coercion,” Antiquité Tardive 17 
(2009): 191–204, carefully unpacks the contemporary language and avoids terms like 
“tolerance” or “intolerance” in favour of “coercion.”
 34 Bremmer, “Religious Violence,” 10–12; Kahlos, Forbearance and Compulsion, 2–4; 
Athanassiadi, Vers la pensée unique, 40; Engels and Van Nuffelen, “Religion and 
Competition,” passim. Canella, “Tolleranza e intolleranza,” 262–6, argues for a similar 
problematisation of the terms publicus, privatus, superstitio, dissimulatio, conviventia, 
and fides.
 35 Kahlos, Forbearance and Compulsion, 2, 6–8.
 36 We see this especially in the Critical Theory of Religion School, where religion is 
determinately negated and secularized in order to locate “religion” positively within 
a humane society. Here the proponents are responding not to the wars of the Counter-
Reformation, but to the horrors of Auschwitz. See Rudolf Siebert, Manifesto of the 
Critical Theory of Society and Religion, 3 vols (Leiden: Brill, 2010).
 37 The most influential proponent of this theory is Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christian-
ity: A Sociologist Reconsiders (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). For 
an insightful overview and critique, see Jan N. Bremmer, The Rise of Christianity 
Through the Eyes of Gibbon, Harnack and Rodney Stark (Groningen: Barkhuis, 2010), 
47–64.
 38 This model has been influential among New Testament scholars, on which see Mayer, 
“Religious Conflict,” 8–10, the first of the Cs sometimes being replaced by scholars 
of Graeco-Roman religion with “cohabitation.” The model of the four Cs is set out by 
Richard Ascough in “Religious Coexistence, Co-Operation, Competition, and Conflict 
in Sardis and Smyrna,” in Religious Rivalries and the Struggle for Success in Sardis and 
Smyrna, ed. Richard S. Ascough (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2005), 
245–52. For an example of the “cohabitation” paradigm, see the articles in Beyond 
Conflicts: Cultural and Religious Cohabitations in Alexandria and Egypt Between the 
1st and the 6th Century CE, ed. Luca Arcari (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017).
 39 See Engels and Van Nuffelen, “Religion and Competition,” 11–12; Turner, “Sociology 
of Religion,” 285; and Siebert, Manifesto, 1:11; although note that critical theory of 
religion proponents view their theory as an alternative to rational choice theory. See 
Warren S. Goldstein, “Introduction: Marx, Critical Theory, and Religion: A Critique 
of Rational Choice,” in Marx, Critical Theory, and Religion: A Critique of Rational 
Choice, ed. Warren S. Goldstein (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 1–2.
 40 See Engels and Van Nuffelen, “Religion and Competition,” 23–4 and literature.
 41 Engels and Van Nuffelen, “Religion and Competition,” esp. 27–9.
 42 Engels and Van Nuffelen, “Religion and Competition,” 24–6.
 43 See the critiques of Frank J. Lechner, “Rational Choice and Religious Economics,” 
in The SAGE Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, ed. J.A. Beckford and N.J. 
W E N D Y  M A Y E R
18
Demerath (London: Sage, 2007), 81–97; and David Lehmann, “An Idea, a Tribe, and 
Their Critics: Rational Choice and the Sociology of Religion,” in The New Black-
well Companion to the Sociology of Religion, ed. Bryan S. Turner (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2010), 181–200.
 44 See e.g., George Lundskow, “The Concept of Choice in the Rise of Christianity: A Cri-
tique of Rational-Choice Theory,” in Marx, Critical Theory, and Religion, 223–48; 
and the works cited by Bremmer, Rise of Christianity, 49 n. 198, where he describes 
Lundskow’s critique as “amateurish.”
 45 See Haidt, “The Emotional Dog”; Ingram, “Critical Rhetoric in the Age of Neurosci-
ence,” 59–66; Clarke, Justification of Religious Violence, 75–7. Ibid., 79–80, however, 
is reluctant to demote the role of reason and questions the validity of Haidt’s findings 
as a- or cross-cultural.
 46 On this point, see esp. the argument of Brent Nongbri, Before Religion: A History of a 
Modern Concept (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013).
 47 Although it should be noted that sociologists of religion trace a divergent path between 
the twentieth-century view of religion and society that developed in the European con-
text and in North America (Turner, “Sociology of Religion,” 291–5). Rational Choice 
Theory, for instance, emerges from the American, Critical Theory from the European 
context. This explains to some degree the opposition of Lundskow, a proponent of 
Critical Theory, to the thesis of Stark.
 48 So Steven Fine in his review of Palestine in Late Antiquity (2008), Review of Bibli-
cal Literature, published online October 17, 2009, www.bookreviews.org, criticizes 
its author, Hagith Sivan, for viewing rabbinic sources through “Christianity-colored 
glasses.” A similar observation is made by Adiel Schremer, Brothers Estranged: Her-
esy, Christianity, and Jewish Identity in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 5, who argues that “the assumption that the destruction of the Second 
Temple marks a rupture in Jewish history subscribes, in a deep sense, to a Christian 
theological claim.”
 49 Jörg Rüpke, “Early Christianity out of, and in, Context,” Journal of Roman Studies 
99 (2009): 182–93, in his lengthy review of the first two volumes in The Cambridge 
History of Christianity series (2006–2007), roundly criticizes the majority of chap-
ters in the first and a smaller number in the second for their dominant Christianity- 
centrism and lack of adequate contextualization. Engels and Van Nuffelen, “Reli-
gion and Competition,” 9 describe acknowledgement of this bias as “having almost 
become a trope.”
 50 Here use of the traditional label “oriental” in opposition to Graeco-Roman religions 
contains its own set of assumptions and biases. For an attempt to re-theorize the 
approach to “oriental” religions within the Roman Empire, see the articles in Pan-
thée: Religious Transformations in the Graeco-Roman Empire, ed. Corinne Bonnet 
and Laurent Bricault (Leiden: Brill, 2013), esp. the introduction, 1–14, where the edi-
tors provide a useful discussion of the development of the label and the approach to the 
religions classified as “oriental” under the influence of Francois Cumont.
 51 See, e.g., Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Phila-
delphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), which proposes multiple Juda-
isms along a spectrum; and the articles in Entre lignes de partage et territoires de 
passage. Les identités religeuses dans les mondes grec et romain: “Paganismes”, 
“judaïsmes,” “christianismes,” Collection de la Revue des Études Juives 47, ed. 
Nicole Belayche and Simon C. Mimouni (Peeters: Leuven, 2009).
 52 E.g., Engels and Van Nuffelen, “Religion and Competition,” 16–18, although, as they 
proceed to argue in the pages that follow, there was considerable variation in the spread 
and type of individual cults over time between classical Greece and imperial Rome. 
See also the recent work of Jörg Rüpke on individual as opposed to public religion 
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in the ancient world; e.g., On Roman Religion: Lived Religion and the Individual in 
Ancient Rome (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).
 53 Moral biconceptualism between the poles liberal-conservative is considered a funda-
mental aspect of embodied cognition by Lakoff, Moral Politics; and Jonathan Haidt, 
The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (London: 
Penguin, 2012).
 54 Among the exceptions, see Johannes Hahn, “Gewaltanwendung ad maiorem gloriam 
dei? Religiöse Intoleranz in der Spätantike,” in Religionsfreiheit, Recht und Toleranz, 
ed. H.-G. Nesselrath et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 227–52, with respect to 
late antiquity; and Marta Reynal-Querol and José G. Montalvo, “A Theory of Reli-
gious Conflict and Its Effect on Growth,” WP-EC 2000-04 (Instituto Valenciano de 
Investigaciones Económicas Working papers, May 2000), with regard to contemporary 
religious conflict.
 55 The different Hindu groups that emerged within India are one example. Equally illus-
trative is the survey of new religious movements with their roots in Indian religions, 
religions of south-east Asia, and in indigenous and pagan traditions in New Religious 
Movements: A Guide. New Religious Movements, Sects, and Spiritualities, ed. Christo-
pher Partridge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 157–302.
 56 See n. 3, to which can be added the volume in which his article appears, Violence in 
Ancient Christianity: Victims and Perpetrators, ed. Albert Geljon and Riemer Rouk-
ema (Leiden: Brill, 2014); Troels M. Kristensen, Making and Breaking the Gods: 
Christian Responses to Pagan Sculpture in Late Antiquity (Aarhus: Aarhus Univer-
sity Press, 2013); Coping with Violence in the New Testament, ed. Pieter G.R. Villiers 
and Jan Willem van Henten (Leiden: Brill, 2012); and Rohmann, Christianity, Book-
Burning and Censorship. See also the articles reflecting on ten years of the SBL panel 
“Violence and Representations of Violence among Jews and Christians,” Ancient Jew 
Review, www.ancientjewreview.com/articles/2016/2/15/violence-and-representations-
of-violence-section-at-10-retrospect-and-prospect, accessed March 26, 2017.
 57 See, for example, the new Journal of Religion and Violence (first issue, 2013); Clarke, 
Justification of Religious Violence; Jimmy Carter, A Call to Action: Women, Religion, 
Violence, and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014); Karen Armstrong, Fields 
of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence (New York: Anchor Books, 2015); The 
Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence, ed. Michael Jerryson et al. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Hans G. Kippenberg, Violence as Worship: Religious Wars 
in the Age of Globalization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), English 
translation of Gewalt als Gottesdienst: Religionskriege im Zeitalter der Globalisierung 
(München: C.H. Beck, 2008); Religion, Terror, and Violence: Religious Studies Per-
spectives, ed. Bryan Rennie and Philip L. Tite (New York: Routledge, 2008); and, for 
an example from the African context, Carole Rakodi, “Inter-Religious Violence and its 
Aftermath: Insights from Indian and Nigerian Cities,” Journal of Asian and African 
Studies 48.5 (2013): 557–76. Studies that seek to define the relationship between reli-
gion and political violence such as James F. Rinehart, Apocalyptic Faith and Political 
Violence: Prophets of Terror (New York: Palgrave, 2006); numerous articles in the 
journal Terrorism and Political Violence; and the foundation of a new discipline called 
Hate Studies, also come under this category.
 58 See, e.g., Religiöser Fundamentalismus in der römischen Kaiserzeit, ed. Pedro Barceló 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2010), although the editor and contributors have been criti-
cized for misinterpreting fanaticism and zealotry as fundamentalism; Religious Fun-
damentalism and Political Extremism, ed. Leonard Weinburg and Ami Pedahzur 
(London: Frank Cass, 2004); Candida R. Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom: Diverse 
Practices, Theologies, and Traditions (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012); 
ead., The Other Christs: Imitating Jesus in Ancient Christian Ideologies of Martyrdom 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); David Cook, Martyrdom in Islam (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Michael Gaddis, There Is No Crime for 
Those Who Have Christ: Religious Violence in the Christian Roman Empire (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 2005); and Rubén Rosario Rodgriguez, Martyrdom 
and Political Violence: A Comparative Theology with Judaism and Islam (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017). Bremmer, Rise of Christianity, 21 n. 90, supplies 
references to recent studies on voluntary martyrdom in the early Christian period, pre-
sumably inspired by the phenomenon in the twenty-first century. For studies that seek 
to bridge the gap between the two time periods, see Jan Bremmer, “The Motivation of 
Martyrs: Perpetua and the Palestinians,” in Religion im kulturellen Diskurs: Festschrift 
für Hans G. Kippenberg zu seinem 65. Geburtstag / Religion in Cultural Discourse. 
Essays in Honor of Hans G. Kippenberg on Occasion of His 65th Birthday, ed. B. 
Luchesi and K. von Stuckrad (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004), 535–54; and id., “Felicitas: 
The Martyrdom of a Young African Woman,” in Perpetua’s Passions: Multidiscipli-
nary Approaches to the Passio Perpetua et Felicitas, ed. Jan N. Bremmer and Marco 
Formisano (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 35–53. A focus on fundamental-
ism has been a significant driver in revitalizing sociology of religion research as it 
seeks to respond to global political developments (see Turner, “Sociology of Reli-
gion,” 295–9).
 59 Charles Kurzman, The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), for instance, argues that contemporary Mus-
lim martyrs are in fact the exception rather than the rule. Candida Moss, The Myth of 
Persecution: How Early Christians Invented a Story of Martyrdom (San Francisco, 
CA: HarperOne, 2013), makes a similar case for the first centuries of Christianity. On 
this phenomenon in scholarship, Jan Bremmer remarks: “Somewhat simplifying we 
can say that the less sympathetic a historian is to Christianity, the lower the number 
of martyrs will be” (Bremmer, Rise of Christianity, 20). His observations (Ibid., 20–3) 
on the ideological drive behind analyses resulting in figures towards either end of the 
scale likely apply equally to scholarly analysis of the practice in contemporary Islam.
 60 See Powell and Clarke, “Religion, Tolerance, and Intolerance,” 23–4, who raise the 
possibility that for some social groups “intolerance in its various manifestations, from 
subtle discrimination and avoidance to outright aggression and homicide, may have 
been adaptive,” although they hastily claim that, even if this is an evolutionary reality, 
it is by no means ethically defensible. Unpalatable as it seems to be to Western sensi-
bilities, this is nonetheless a question that needs to be tackled unprejudicially.
 61 Fox and Sandler, “The Question of Religion”; and see Reynal-Querol and Montalvo, 
“A Theory of Religious Conflict,” who look at the intersection between religion, eth-
nicity, and economic growth.
 62 Engels and Van Nuffelen, “Religion and Competition,” 12–23.
 63 See the works cited in n. 53 above.
 64 The literature on this topic is mounting as is debate concerning the precise degree of 
discrepancy and the impact of the rhetoric of destruction on action. For representa-
tive books and articles on this topic see: Aude Busine, “From Stones to Myth: Tem-
ple Destruction and Civic Identity in the Late Antique Roman East,” Journal of Late 
Antiquity 6.2 (2013): 325–46; Kristensen, Making and Breaking the Gods; Jitse Dijk-
stra, “The Fate of the Temples in Late Antique Egypt,” in The Archaeology of Late 
Antique “Paganism,” ed. Luke Lavan and Michael Mulryan (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 
389–436; Klaus S. Freyberger, “Zur Nachnutzung heidnischer Heiligtümer aus Nord- 
und Südsyrien in spätantiker Zeit,” in Nesselrath et al., Für Religionsfreiheit, Recht 
und Toleranz, 179–226; and From Temple to Church: Destruction and Renewal of 
Local Cultic Topography in Late Antiquity, ed. J. Hahn, S. Emmel, and U. Gotter (Lei-
den: Brill, 2008). See also the chapter by Jitse Dijkstra in the present volume.
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work of Candida Moss (see n. 58), culminating in her controversial book The Myth of 
Persecution.
 66 Ingram, “Critical Rhetoric in the Age of Neuroscience,” 133–78. See my preliminary 
exploration of the applicability of this approach in Wendy Mayer, “Preaching Hatred? 
John Chrysostom, Neuroscience, and the Jews,” in (Revisioning John Chrysostom: 
New Perspectives Theories and Approaches, ed. C.L. de Wet and W. Mayer (Leiden: 
Brill, forthcoming).
 67 For a summation of both Burke and Bourdieu on the intransigence of piety/habitus, 
see Jack, “The Piety of Degradation,” 451–3. What Burke and Bourdieu try to capture 
in their theories are the mechanisms described by recent studies in neuroplasticity and 
social and cognitive psychology in their description of how cognitive framing and 
metaphors function, the process of the strengthening of neural pathways by both men-
tal and physical repetition, the priority of intuitive/subconscious affect/emotion over 
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via logical discourse or reasoned argument. Ingram, “Critical Rhetoric in the Age of 
Neuroscience,” 55 onwards, provides a careful and detailed account of the meeting 
points between the theories of Burke, Bourdieu, De Certeau, and Foucault and the find-
ings of neuroscience, with special attention to the mechanisms engaged in resistance 
to persuasion, in persuasion by emotional rhetoric, and the short- and long-term effects 
on the brain of rhetorical violence.
 68 For a useful outline and discussion of this theory, see Powell and Clarke, “Religion, 
Tolerance, and Intolerance,” 19–22. Teehan, In the Name of God, 1–42, argues that this 
is intimately connected to moral psychology.
 69 See, among numerous other examples, Susanna Drake, Slandering the Jews: Sexuality 
and Difference in Early Christian Texts (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2013); Jan N. Bremmer, “Early Christian Human Sacrifice Between Fact and 
Fiction,” in Sacrifices humains: dossiers, discours, comparaisons. Actes du colloque 
tenu à l’Université de Genève, 19–20 mai 2011, ed. Agnès A. Nagy and Francesca 
Prescendi (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 165–76; Averil Cameron, “Jews and Heretics – a 
Category Error?” in The Ways That Never Parted: Jews and Christian in Late Antiquity 
and the Early Middle Ages, ed. Adam H. Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed (Tübin-
gen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 344–60, esp. 351; and Andrew McGowan, “Eating People: 
Accusations of Cannibalism Against Christians in the Second Century,” Journal of 
Early Christian Studies 2 (1994): 413–42.
 70 There is a strong link between the theory that “orthodoxy” or purity discourse is a 
unique product of monotheism and the thesis that monotheism = intolerance. Again, 
the work of Assmann, although much criticized, has been influential in this respect. For 
an entry to the substantial literature on both sides of this debate, see n. 6 above.
 71 This is a feature of recent discussion concerning “the parting of the ways” between 
Judaism and Christianity, for which the literature is vast. See, e.g., the articles in La 
Croisée des chemins revisitée: Quand l’Église et la synagogue se sont elles distin-
guées? ed. Simon Mimouni and Bernard Pouderon (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2012), esp. 
that of Annette Yoshiko Reed, and earlier literature cited. For other recent examples, 
see Tobias Nicklas, Jews and Christians? Second-Century “Christian” Perspectives 
on the “Parting of the Ways” (Annual Deichmann Lectures 2013) (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2014); and the articles in The Faces of the Other: Religious Rivalry and Eth-
nic Encounters in the Later Roman World, ed. Maijastina Kahlos (Turnhout: Brepols, 
2011).
 72 A recent example in this respect is the article by David Engels, “Historising Religion 
Between Spiritual Continuity and Friendly Takeover: Salvation History and Religious 
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Competition During the First Millennium AD,” in Engels and Van Nuffelen, Religion 
and Competition in Antiquity, 237–84.
 73 The reconstruction of a religion’s past in memory (mnemohistory) is the primary 
approach of Jan Assmann based on the work of Maurice Halbwachs. See, e.g., Jan Ass-
mann, Religion und kulturelles Gedächtnis (München: C.H Beck, 2000); Naftali Cohn, 
The Memory of the Temple and the Making of the Rabbis (Philadelphia, PA: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2013) demonstrates the value of this approach for understand-
ing the construction of Rabbinic identity at a time of conflicting and competing models 
of Judaean-/Jewishness in the second to third centuries. Robert McEachnie, “A History 
of Heresy Past: The Sermons of Chromatius of Aquileia, 388–407,” Church History 
83 (2014): 273–96, does the same for Christianity in Italy in the later fourth century. 
Philip A. Cantrell, II, “ ‘We Were a Chosen People’: The East African Revival and 
Its Return to Post-Genocide Rwanda,” Church History 83 (2014): 422–45 offers a 
contemporary African example. Cantrell traces the inadvertently precarious situation 
that the post-genocide Anglican Church in Rwanda currently faces as a result of the 
construction by Tutsi refugees of a mythico-history of themselves as a divinely “cho-
sen people” in the pre-genocide Ugandan camps. The “Revival then and its complex 
re-telling now,” as he summarizes, “will either promote more division or more unity” 
(445). See also Christopher Duncan, Violence and Vengeance: Religious Conflict and 
Its Aftermath in Eastern Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), who 
engages with the complex interaction of memory, religion, and identity in hardening 
and escalating local violence.
 74 See Boyarin, Border Lines, regarding the presence of these categories in late ancient 
Jewish as well as Christian discourse; Robert Langer and Udo Simon, “The Dynamics 
of Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy: Dealing with Divergence in Muslim Discourses and 
Islamic Studies,” Die Welt des Islams 48 (2008): 273–88; and John B. Henderson, The 
Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy: Neo-Confucian, Islamic, Jewish and Early 
Christian Patterns (Albany: State University of New York, 1998). There is also an 
emerging discussion as to whether, in a limited way, the concepts of “heresy” and 
“orthodoxy” were also present in Graeco-Roman philosophy. See Polymnia Athanas-
siadi, “The Creation of Orthodoxy in Neoplatonism,” in Philosophy and Power in 
the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin, ed. Gillian Clark and 
Tessa Rajak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 271–92; Digeser, A Threat to 
Public Piety; and Vera Sauer, Relgiöses in der politischen Argumentation der späten 
römischen Republik: Ciceros Erste Catilinarische Rede – eine Fallstudie (Suttgart: 
Franz Steiner, 2013).
 75 Bremmer, “Religious Violence.”
 76 Douglas Boin, “Hellenistic ‘Judaism’ and the Social Origins of the ‘Pagan-Christian’ 
Debate,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 22.2 (2014): 167–96. Cf. Christopher P. 
Jones, Between Pagan and Christian (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2014), 6, on “pagan” as a Christian in-group label, but his interest is more in the actual 
state of relations between Christians and “pagans.”
 77 Abel Mordechai Bibliowicz, Jews and Gentiles in the Early Jesus Movement: An 
Unintended Journey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Cf. Patricia A. Power, 
“Blurring the Boundaries: American Messianic Jews and Gentiles,” Nova religio: The 
Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 15.1 (2011): 69–91, whose account of 
an incipient conflict in the case of the Messianic Jewish community in America offers 
a comparable case with markedly similar agents two millennia later.
 78 See, e.g., Arietta Papaconstantinou, “Saints and Saracens: On some Miracle Accounts 
of the Early Arab Period,” in Byzantine Religious Culture: Studies in Honor of Alice-
Mary Talbot, ed. Denis Sullivan et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 323–38; ead., “Historiog-
raphy, Hagiography, and the Making of the Coptic ‘Church of the Martyrs’ in Early 
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Islamic Egypt,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 60 (2006): 65–86; David Engels, “Entre 
tolérance, désintérêt et exploitation: Les relations christiano-musulmanes en Sicilie du 
IXe au XIIIe siècle et leurs racines dans l’histoire religieuse de l’île,” Cahiers de Médi-
terranée 86 (2013): 273–300; and Glenn Peers, “Finding Faith Underground: Visions 
of the Forty Martyrs Oratory at Syracuse,” in Looking Beyond: Visions, Dreams and 
Insights in Medieval Art and History, ed. Colum Hourihane (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 84–106.
 79 See Powell and Clarke, “Religion, Tolerance, and Intolerance,” 11–22, who outline a 
number of approaches that might prove beneficial; and, e.g., Lawrence Barsalou et al., 
“Embodiment in Religious Knowledge,” Journal of Cognition and Culture 5 (2005): 
14–57, with relevance for understanding the role of orthopraxy; and Juliette Schaafsma 
and Kipling D. Williams, “Exclusion, Intergroup Hostility, and Religious Fundamen-
talism,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (2012): 829–37, which points 
to the radicalizing effects of marginalization and in-group/out-group exclusion.
 80 Mar Marcos, “Religious Violence and Hagiography in Late Antiquity,” Numen 62.2–3 
(2015): 169–96.
 81 Brett Ingram’s phrase “the age of neuroscience,” with its suggestion that human soci-
ety is now moving into the next age beyond that of reason, has both its advantages 
and disadvantages. An inherent danger is the evocation of social evolution theory or 
Social Darwinism, which may be precisely what the findings of the neurosciences 
speak against.
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